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16 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: 15 June Meeting at State on Canadian Proposal

1. On Thursday, 15 June, Mr. William Bundy convened Mr. Cooper, Mr. Green (of INR, representing Mr. Hughes), Mr. Habib and myself to discuss the Department's response to a Canadian proposal.

2. In essence, Foreign Secretary Paul Martin had broached to Secretary Rusk the idea of our suspending our bombing in return for an ICC policing of the DMZ. The object of the meeting was to review this proposition and, specifically, work up the text of a "Dear Paul" letter from Rusk to Martin.

3. There was a wide range of discussion which I tried to bring into focus by insisting that we initially decide whether we wanted to make a pitch for international propaganda purposes (confident that Hanoi would reject) or wanted to make a serious overture that might be picked up. The consensus conclusion was that Hanoi was unlikely to accept any effective policing of the DMZ, but that our proposition should be one we could live with if Hanoi did take it up. Mr. Cooper raised the thought of our working through the Soviets, an idea the rest of us swiftly shot down. Mr. Habib and I stressed the need of advising the South Vietnamese early in the game if we did anything with the Canadian proposal, [REDACTED]

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4. We finally decided that the proposal was a non-starter if it involved nothing more than a few ICC observation teams in the DMZ. If, however, the ICC could, or would be willing, to put in a substantial force (a minimum of 3,000 men) which would engage in active patrolling by foot, jeep, boat and helicopter throughout the length of the DMZ, the proposition merited further consideration. We also decided that the

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first step should be to determine whether the Canadians were willing to talk in terms of -- and help raise -- a force of this size operating under a sufficiently broad charter.

5. The following specific immediate courses of action were agreed upon:

a) Bundy will draft a letter to Martin along the lines outlined above which we will then review.

b) Bundy will endeavor to persuade the Secretary, and anyone else who needs to be persuaded, that under no circumstances should this Canadian proposal even be mentioned to the Soviets during Kosygin's visit.

6. I will keep you advised of what, if anything, further develops on this activity.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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